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Abstract 
Although the extended self construct (Belk, 1988) has been widely investigated in 
consumer research, it has inspired relatively few critiques.  Moreover, there has been 
little research which directly assesses consumers’ own emic perspectives on the extended 
self.  Here, an empirical investigation is reported which explicitly solicits consumers’ 
own ideas and hermeneutically considers them in relation to etic researcher theory. The 
findings indicate a major theoretical blind spot: not only do consumers differ in the 
polysemy, i.e., the various meanings and discourses they apply to the extended self, but 
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“Am I as extended as you say I am?”  
Consumers’ emic perspectives on the extended self 
 
The application of self as a major construct in consumer research largely focuses on 
consumers using goods for its instantiation and expression. However, as various 
postmodern commentaries suggest, the cohesive vision of this self has become 
fragmented so that it is seen, to varying degrees, to be produced as multiple selves, roles 
and identities (e.g. Giddens, 1991).  One major line of consumer research reflecting both 
the expressive and fragmented aspects of self involves the concept of the ‘extended self’.  
As introduced by Belk (1988), the extended self is differentiated from the core self in its 
incorporation of distal possessions.  The impact of this construct has been enormous and 
the idea has appeared as ‘settled’ in consumer research in that there have been relatively 
few critical challenges.  
We address this major theoretical blind spot through providing a critical 
perspective informed by an empirical investigation of consumers’ own views of the 
extended self. Three interpretive studies were conducted which report how consumers 
polysemically view the extended self.  The main potential contribution is to problematise 
its naturalized conceptualization which was formed without any direct evidence 
regarding consumers’ own views regarding the existence of such a self.  Belk’s 
formulation naturalizes the extended self to the extent that it can be thought of as if it is a 
taken-for-granted, everyday reality (Peñaloza, 2008). This naturalization occurs in two 
overlapping senses: (1) naturalizing the etic construct of the extended self and (2) 




also emphasize more broadly our contribution toward grounding marketing theories of 
real-world consumers in their own personal meanings and understandings.  Such 
grounding is often overlooked in much theory development, including that of the 
extended self. 
 
Critical enquiry into the extended self 
This study takes inspiration from critical marketing discourse (e.g., Tadajewski and 
Brownlie, 2008) in an attempt to identify alternative conceptual perspectives within 
consumer research, through a process of reflexive deconstruction.  This approach is 
adopted to  reveal theoretical deficiencies (Brownlie and Hewer, 2007) and suggest new 
ways of thinking about traditional constructs by exposing and questioning assumed 
claims to knowledge (Gould, 2010). Thus, we reflexively formulate fundamental 
questions about the conditions and consequences of two naturalized perspectives (cf. 
Thompson, 2002), one in which the consumer’s own perspective may  reflect the idea of 
one core self and the etic consumer research view which largely privileges a naturalized 
extended self (Belk, 1988).  We also interrogate how these perspectives manifest and 
interrelate and seek to uncover blind spots that subvert any attempts to reassert 
conceptual closure. 
 Belk (1988: 160) proposes that: “Self-extension occurs through control and 
mastery of an object, through knowledge of an object, and through contamination via 
proximity and habituation of an object.”  He drew from over 300 sources of references 
drawn from various social science theories in a compelling attempt to identify 




2005). Belk (1988: 160) was thus enabled to conclude that, “we are what we have and 
that this may be the most basic and powerful fact of consumer behavior”.   
 However, Cohen (1989: 125) suggested that the concept of the extended self is 
“an all-encompassing explanation for behavior” that lacks individual and collective 
meaning, empirical identification and explanatory power.  He queries meaning in relation 
to a farmer’s parcel of land: “At what point conceptually does the farm become 
incorporated into the farmer’s sense of self rather than being of great importance but still 
external to the self?” (Cohen, 1989: 126).   
Belk (1989) responded to Cohen (1989) by citing self-perception research where 
respondents had suggested there was a close link between themselves and their 
possessions.  But, unfortunately, this issue was caught up within the larger paradigmatic 
positivistic-interpretivist debate.  Cohen represented the positivistic aspect and this 
allowed Belk to argue that the extended self could not be reduced to a simplistic 
boundary-laden, scientific concept.  Instead, he contended that it is a powerful metaphor 
for characterizing consumer perceptions about how the self relates to possessions.  
Reflecting agreement with Belk on that point, this paper does not take issue with such an 
approach since it will apply an interpretive analysis to consumers’ own perceptions of 
self and possessions. Yet, Cohen’s main critique of the extended self vis-à-vis the core 
self remains largely unanswered.   
Moreover, only a small number of extended self critiques have attempted to 
further deconstruct its meaning and utility in such terms as its overextension (Solomon 
1990), degrees of selfness (Ahuvia, 2005), aspects of self relations to goods and others 




extended self (Velliquette, Murray and Creyer, 1998). However, these studies largely 
skirt the issues raised within the Belk-Cohen debate concerning the meaning of self in 
relation to goods.  Therefore, while they suggest that the extended self construct fails to 
explain attachments, they never address Cohen’s issue that alternative perspectives on 
such a self may lead to consumers having altogether different relationships to goods.  
Indeed, there may be two different pathways through which consumers form attachments 
to goods, one through the extended self and one through other means.  
Cohen (1994: 2) noted that the extended self is “not a monolith; it is plastic, 
variable and complex” and therefore requires subtle and sensitive deconstruction.   
Moreover, such self-discourses may be seen as major aspects of cultural discourses, self-
mythologies and identity work (Arsel and Thompson, 2011).  This means that 
understandings of the extended self may not reflect a single cultural myth-metanarrative 
but rather are embedded in myriad cultural discourses.  Thus, the idea of the extended 
self and how consumers conceive it may be viewed as contextually constructed in 
individuals’ autobiographic narratives. What is especially unclear is whether just as 
consumers perceive something they call the self in their everyday discourse, they also 
explicitly perceive the extended self as such and if so, what meanings they assign to it.  
This adds a possible way to distinguish what is being examined here: If a consumer 
cherishes certain goods, are they perceived as part of the self or not and what are the 
associated meanings?  Moreover, this implies that universalizing both the extended self 
as well as core self constructs naturalizes them in ways that not all may recognize, 
including, for instance, researchers versus consumers.     




self (Belk, 1988) is a naturalized everyday concept (cf. Peñaloza, 2008).  For Cohen 
(1989) and other critics, this naturalizing aspect of the extended self is not an issue.  
Indeed, when Belk, Cohen and other critics speak of the self, they are also speaking of a 
naturalized concept that seemingly all, both researchers and consumers, recognize and 
reify. However, while the extended self is a naturalized concept that some researchers 
might treat as such, many consumers could see it as a counterfactual fantasy rather than 
as a taken for granted description of their everyday ‘realities’.  
 
Addressing the extended self blind spot 
Given the widespread applications of the extended self in the face of what could be 
withering critiques of it, we are left to examine a blind spot in consumer theory. The 
approach taken here involves a reflexive critique of consumer research (Thompson, 
2002) regarding the ignoring of certain alternative theories, such as Cohen’s (1989), and 
the privileging of others. However, our critique also involves thinking more explicitly 
about consumers’ own personal or emic perspectives regarding the extended self.  
To this end, we are informed by the anthropological debate between Sahlins (1992) 
and Obeyesekere (1992) over how to best represent Hawaiians at the time of Captain 
Cook’s death. Sahlins called Cook’s death a religious sacrificial act while Obeyesekere 
argued that Cook was murdered by natives because he was trying to exploit the island 
and kidnap one of their chiefs. Obeyesekere's critique of Sahlins is that he accepted the 
colonial accounts at face value without a critical reading, whereas Obeyesekere’s account 
dismisses “Hawaiian voices in sweeping terms” (Parker, 1995: 259).  As Borofsky 




cross-purposes. No matter how much evidence each presents to buttress his case, the 
other does not concur because he uses a different though related perspective to 
demonstrate different though related points.” Thus, parallels exist with the Belk-Cohen 
debate in that both Sahlins (1992) and Obeyesekere (1992) seem more concerned with 
naturalizing their own positions. As a result of these processes of naturalization, emic 
distinctions are likely to be absent within both the Sahlins-Obeyesekere and Belk-Cohen 
debates, thereby privileging etic theorization.    
We also follow Foucault (1989: 30) “to re-examine evidence and assumptions, 
to shake up habitual ways of…thinking, to dissipate conventional familiarities”. 
Similarly, Myles (2004) deconstructs sociologists’ doxa (the natural attitude of taking for 
granted various phenomena) and suggests moving to being more reflexively informed by 
everyday people’s consciousness. In consumer research, Peñaloza (2008: 420) argues 
that “we continue to naturalize our research methods and findings” in ways that privilege 
etic theorizations over possible unrecognized or even contrary emic evidence.  Here, we 
start with a research question based on an etic controversy and seek to further investigate 
it from consumers’ own emic perspectives.   
Thus, so-called naïve-lay views might be theoretically relevant (Wegener and 
Petty, 1998).  For example, Belk speaks of research on the self-perceptions of consumers 
as evidence for the extended self.  However, since that research did not start with how 
consumers explicitly thought about it, it is likely that some element of conceptualization 
is missing. For example, consumers readily understand the concept of self and apply it in 
their everyday lives, but do not appear to generally use the term extended self. The issue 




imposed upon consumers as Cohen implies and not something they hold themselves.  
  The main idea is also informed by Kozinets (2002: 26) who applied the “emic 
familiarity with apparently etic concepts” of consumers in their critiques of and tensions 
with such culturally-charged terms as consumer, marketing and advertising.  Here, self is 
such an emic-etic shared, co-constructed term while the extended self may or may not be 
literally recognized by consumers though it likely could be in other terms.  While it is 
possible there is a tacit-implicit extended self researchers may apply, Ringberg and 
Reihlen (2008) suggest that consumers make sense of the self through both categorical-
automatic and reflective-critical processes. Similarly, Schroeder and Borgerson (2003) 
support the idea of projection of tacit-automatic processes through personal narratives. 
Likewise, research involving written-verbal protocols asks consumers about their own 
understandings regarding particular situations (Rook, 1987).  In such investigations, the 
assumption of the so-called lay consumer-scientist is useful for verifying results and/or 
generating insights for both theory comparison and for interpreting consumers’ own 
practices and discourses. Indeed, the disciplines of metacognitive research, 
ethnopsychology and everyday folk psychology address relatively transparent aspects of 
individuals’ thinking and knowledge about their own thought and related cognitive, 
social and cultural processes (Lillard, 1998).   
Thus, the idea of asking consumers directly about their own theories of the self 
has a diverse heritage of marrying the thought of a number of disciplines to generate an 
uncommon, if not entirely new approach in interpretive consumer research, namely to 
ask consumers about various everyday constructs such as the extended self and have 




then critically reflect upon (dis)similarities in consumer-emic and researcher-etic 
theories. Additionally, the aim of this paper should not be construed as diminishing the 
significance of etic theory but rather as seeking insights which might inform, modify 
and/or enrich it.  
  In summary, our research aims to comparatively assess consumers’ own emic 
perspectives and etic-researcher theories of the extended self.  A further aim, informed 
by Borgerson’s (2005) perspective that both Belk and Cohen fail to penetrate issues of 
self, especially its materiality and identity constitution, is to emergently map consumers’ 
own perspectives that reach beyond prior researcher critiques and draw implications for 
re-thinking etic theory.  
After introducing the method in the next section, we then report on three partly 
overlapping studies, which address the two primary aims.  Study 1 found that some study 
participants supported the idea of the extended self while others rejected it.  Two further 
subthemes emerged: the distinction between the inner (non-physical) and outer 
(physical) aspects of self, and resistance to the extended self’s perceived materialism.  
Studies 2 and 3 further penetrated consumers’ perspectives by emergently considering 
what terms they, themselves, use to describe this self.   
To further distinguish consumer perspectives, all three studies were considered 
together and additional distinct themes, such as anthropomorphism or personality, 
emerged which largely either support the extended self, do not support it, or may do 
both. Most notably, agency in terms of the self, but also in terms of a co-created 








Informed, as discussed above, by research evidence for both the explicit aspects of 
consciousness and metacognitive lay theories, a direct, if exploratory approach for 
assessing consumers’ perspectives was taken.1 A computerized, semi-structured written 
protocol approach was used to provide what has been called a structured essay (Tinsley, 
1997), solicited narrative (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975) or written essay (Donmoyer and 
Yennie-Donmoyer, 1995). These approaches provide revelatory narratives which are 
phenomenological in drawing out participants’ thoughts and feelings (Rook, 1987). They 
also permit simultaneous responses from multiple participants separated from one 
another, thus enabling a greater number and range of opinions in a given time period 
when compared to other interview methods (Tinsley, 1997).   
In Study 1, where the participants are asked to make a choice between a given set 
of possible responses (e.g., either possessions are or are not part of the self), the question 
is presented as neutrally as possible either on a computer screen or printed page and 
participants then provide their own thoughts and perceptions. Similar to 
phenomenological interviews, this approach seeks to limit the perceived power and 
knowledgeability of the researcher while privileging the participant’s subjectivity 
(Thompson, Pollio, and Locander, 1994).  
 The participants in Study 1 focused on this open-ended question, “Are products 
and possessions part of the self?”  They (along with the participants in the subsequent 




Eastern U.S. and had not studied consumer behavior. There were 49 participants ages 19 
to 43 (26 females). The sample was relatively homogeneous in terms of the participants 
all being students.  Thus, should differences of opinion regarding the extended self 
emerge, they would be strongly indicative of variation in practices and meanings that is 
less likely to be the product of socio-cultural differences, such as age or social class, 
though this does not rule them out.  
 This approach differs from other interpretive research, which may seek to 
capture sociocultural diversity by selecting individuals who are maximally different in 
demographic and/or psychographic profiles. Here, the emphasis is on exploring possibly 
competing cultural discourses among individuals of similar socio-cultural status (Allen, 
Diefendorff and Ma, 2013).  Moreover, while it might be argued that the participants 
were business students who might have been exposed to marketing notions of self and 
would thus be biased, they generally were not marketing majors; indeed the personalized 
reflexivity, variety and broad range of their answers suggest there was no one 
‘normalized’ perspective.  Thus, while eventually differences among various 
collectivities may be investigated, a post-structural approach suggests that each 
individual is a site of meaning, even while situated in a similar cultural context (Gould, 
2010). Therefore, differences within shared collectivities might provide even stronger 
evidence for making claims about varying emic-informed theories of the extended self. 
Study participants came in groups of up to seven to a room with a bank of computers and 
typed in their responses to the questions.  Seventeen informants wrote their answers in 
longhand.  They stayed between 15 to 45 minutes and answered in paragraphs ranging 




Studies 2 and 3 evolved from Study 1 to fine-tune its methodological limitations, 
enabling the reduction of possible demand artifacts, specifically in how and whether the 
term “extended self” was used in question prompts. Thus, the update feature of probing 
in interviews used in qualitative research is at least partially captured in a different, if 
exploratory way, i.e., by analyzing the results of the first study and determining what 
bears investigation to generate further questions which subsequently became the bases 
for Studies 2 and 3.  Therefore, instead of having the participants consider the extended 
self as a received term, there remains a need to let them choose their own terms, whether 
or not they think it exists.  This approach is informed by Cotte et al. (2004) who felt in 
their study of time-use that it required a wider range of metaphors to interpret it than was 
previously available; here the extended self construct necessitates such a range.  Further, 
while the analysis focused on emerging general themes, the richness of the 
individualized responses in Study 1 suggested that giving the participants even more 
freedom in how they perceived the construct might be fruitful. Study 2 was designed 
with this in mind.  Thus, since Belk (1988) was interested in the extended self metaphor, 
this study took a step in flushing out its metaphoric meanings in rather explicit terms, 
though here participants supply their own metaphors rather than researchers assigning 
them.  It also provided for the emergence of symbolic metaphors as distinct perspectives 
for each consumer (Thompson, Pollio and Locander, 1994). There were 61 participants 
(34 females, 4 not reporting their gender), ages 19-49, who were asked, “Whatever your 





However, one further limitation appeared; asking the participants for “extended 
self” alternatives might still yield a demand artifact.  While the desired explicitness was 
retained, the relatively restrictive wording of the main questions was reduced, thereby 
affording the participants more freedom.  In fact, participants in Study 2, especially those 
supporting the extended self, tended to use that specific term though not exclusively, 
while those who came up with other names tended not to support the idea of the 
extended self. So to afford even greater latitude to the participants and reduce possible 
confounding and demand effects, Study 3 was developed.  It never used the term 
“extended self” at all, and instead, asks on a relatively unaided basis, “Whatever your 
view, we would like to know what you would call this form of consumer behavior in your 
own words.” There were 29 participants (17 females), ages 20 to 36.  These two studies 
are reported with their responses by study, what they call this self, and support or 
opposition to the concept2.  
The resulting texts were subjected to a hermeneutic analysis using the interview 
texts, prior research and researcher insights. Consumers’ emic theories were then 
compared to researchers’ etic theories (Kozinets, 2002), the only difference being that 
the participants were explicitly addressing an etic theoretical construct.  The goal was to 
rethink etic marketing theory, as one more informed by consumers’ own meanings 
regarding the extended self. 
 
Study 1 findings: extended self or not? 
While all three studies explored the issue of whether and how consumers perceive the 




and attempts to better understand the link between possessions and the self. Following a 
hermeneutic procedure, themes and related theories are interpretively applied.  The 
responses generally indicated that the participants had very different views of the 
extended self, some supporting Belk and some resembling Cohen. Ben (21) supported 
Belk’s idea of the extended self: 
Products are a part of ones-self.  Whatever product you buy or food you 
eat is a representation of yourself.  People are not one-dimensional so the 
products one person buys may greatly differ, but all of the products show 
something about the person… Whatever… prompted the consumer to buy 
that product, whether it is the color, style or possible usefulness, shows 
what the consumer prioritizes in life.  Even if a consumer buys a product 
for its convenience that is an extension of the personality of the 
consumer… Everything is a choice and the options that are chosen, make 
people who they are. 
Indeed, a number of participants understood the idea of both self and extended 
self through the lens of personality which itself is a naturalized concept.  
For a view that saw the self as entirely different from products and possessions 
and echoes Cohen concerning goods as external to the self, consider what Jenny (20) 
said: 
Products and possessions are among the things we own but they do not 
form part of ourselves. For example, a pair of shoes is a product that we 
own, but is not part of who I am.  I do agree with the argument “Anything 




might be to us.” Products and possessions are not part of oneself; 
however, people, culture, religion, ethnicity, personality, beliefs, and 
values are part of oneself.  They form the person we are today… we can 
say “my job, my house, my husband/wife,” they do form part of our life 
but not part of whom you are. 
These results indicate that the extended self-concept is deconstructed when we 
consider consumers’ emic perspectives; some participants echoed Cohen while others 
accorded with Belk.  Excavating this deconstruction further, two additional subthemes 
can be identified: inner versus outer self and materialism versus resistance. 
 
The inner (non-physical) versus outer (physical) self  
When considering whether possessions were part of the self, it became apparent that a 
significant number of participants made a distinction between the inner (non-physical) 
and outer (physical) aspects of self. This dimension is similar to Belk’s conceptualization 
of self versus environment with fuzzy boundaries.  The issue of physicality in relation to 
the extended self arose in the response of Belk (1989: 129) to Cohen when he asserted, 
“boundaries of the extended self are perceptual, not physical or physiological.” Much of 
what has been conceived as the extended self was seen by the participants as being 
entirely external to the self and is consistent with research on the embodied self 
suggesting that it is constrained by the symbolic or inner self (Markman and Brendl, 
2005).  Markman and Brendl find that self as a symbolic phenomenon may be viewed as 
separate from the physical body.  Their formulation is quite different from Belk’s who 




represent the relation between the inner (non-physical) and outer (physical) self.  For 
some, it seems to follow an embodied cognition perspective in which the self is 
represented in the body as its extension while for others it is not so represented at all.  
For example, one informant reflects on the boundary between the inner (non-physical) 
and outer (physical) in externality terms: 
 
Your externality can also be part of self… The type of clothes you wear is 
all part of yourself or rather you being you.  It is not strange for someone 
with a gloomy disposition to wear all black, or on the other hand someone 
who is joyous to wear lively colors (Ruth, 23). 
 However, Randi (20) applies this physical/non-physical distinction differently. 
Product and possessions are not part of oneself.  These items may be very 
important to us but in order to be part of oneself, it has to be from within 
the person.  It can be physical or intangible.  For example, the heart is part 
of a person, without it, the person may die… I agree that anything outside 
the self is just not part of oneself.   
Laticia (21), while clearly distinguishing a non-physical self apart from objects, 
allowed for something akin to the projection of self through goods: 
Though products and possessions cannot be directly defined as part of the 
“self” as I’ve defined it, I do feel that physical items we actively choose 
by the free will of our consciousness are extensions of the “self” into the 
material world… the variety of preferences and the existence of those that 




possessions can be looked upon as physical extensions of the “self”.   
Taking a similar view with respect to physicality versus non-physicality, one 
participant nonetheless also used this perspective to distinguish goods from the core self: 
Another example of personal belongings being separate from one-self is 
the physical aspect of the belongings.  If these belongings were destroyed 
in a fire or were stolen that would not change someone’s personality.  It 
may change how someone feels about things but they are still the same 
person… No one can do that with their personality (Herm, 21). 
This quote, which echoes others across all three studies, seems to contradict 
Belk’s focus on loss of possessions as crucial to the extended self.  Loss of goods may 
not always reflect a loss of self though further research with people in actual loss 
situations, particularly those where the goods are of high personal or financial value, 
might be warranted to assess consumers’ extended self perspectives (cf. Ariely, Huber 
and Wertenbrock, 2005).  Nonetheless, while Belk recognized both how goods may flow 
into or out of the extended self (Kleine et al., 1995), a more focused aspect emerged here. 
Goods as aspects of the extended self are often seen as transitory and for some, this 
element contradicts the extended self while supporting a more permanent core self, if 
also a sense of it as being adaptable: 
My possessions such as my clothes, car, jewelry are not a part of me. They 
are just things that belong to me.  In a short time, I will probably get rid of 
them… with some exceptions… What I consider the self is my thoughts, 
views, beliefs and ideas about life and my surroundings.  These are the 




friends value about me (Sarah, 20).  
In many respects, these results indicate that for many participants what is 
conceptualized as the extended self is largely external to the core self and its non-
physicality; the physicality and the relative impermanence of goods informs that view. 
As such, the participants can be seen to  inscribe their accounts with a variety of physical 
and symbolic attributes.(cf. Cohen, 1989; Ahuvia, 2005).  Quite noticeably, there are 
distinct individual differences in these construals, such that for some participants self-
characteristics are more embodied in physical representations than for others.  This is a 
very constructivist, localized-poststructuralist perspective and argues for complexity, 
ambiguity and a lack of universalism in consumers’ extended self-construals.   
 
Materialism and resistance  
Not surprisingly, some Study 1 participants saw the issue of extended self as reflecting 
materialism, often overly so, suggesting that the framing of the extended self is 
multilevel; the construct is framed both in micro terms as to how it is embodied with 
respect to the self and socio-culturally in material culture terms as to how it is 
instantiated in particular meanings, practices and ideologies (Miller, 1998).  Illustrative 
of this, Lenka (24), who supported the idea of the extended self and was the only one 
among the supporters who overtly naturalized it, suggested we are socially-conditioned 
to accept possessions as parts of the self:  
Often an individual’s worth in society… is judged by his wealth and the 
numerous things he possesses.  Status is connected to possessions.  Since 




believe that products and possessions are a part of one self… people 
probably don’t even question the connection between the self and 
possessions; it is natural to many of us.  
But Herm (21), reflecting the resistance that was apparent in many participants, 
disclaimed the extended self and bemoaned the materialism that judges people by their 
wealth and goods: 
Products and possessions are not [bold his] an extension of one-self.  
Though it is unfortunate… that people are judged by their possessions. I 
believe that it is true that anything outside the self is just that, outside 
oneself… It is important to remember that possessions do not make a 
person; a person makes a person. 
Sue (20) distinguished the outer and inner in terms of materiality:  
Material goods can have some sentimental value that may cause a person 
to become very attached to it.  For example, an engagement ring or 
family’s heirlooms are usually goods, which hold great sentimental value.  
Most people hold these goods dear to their heart and feel that they could 
not live without them… After losing this material good, the person’s 
personality or character has not changed in anyway.  The inner and outer 
self still remain the same... I do not believe that worldly possessions could 
ever be part of your extended self and alter your inner self at their 






Discussion of study 1 
While the Study 1 results echo the Belk-Cohen debate in reflecting one or the other view, 
they also expand it through the themes of the inner versus outer self and materialism and 
resistance. The inner-outer theme reflects the meanings consumers attach to the extended 
self in sharply demarcating the inner-symbolic and outer-physical selves. The 
materialism theme is found in Belk’s original formulation, as well, and for some it 
seemed both desirable and natural for the extended self to incorporate material goods.  
However, for many others, such a naturalizing-materialistic view of self represents a 
negative.  This view, which was well beyond what Belk (1988) had theorized, gave 
shape to a decided resistance; many, though not all of the participants, were 
uncomfortable with equating even a part of themselves with a materialistic orientation. 
These results indicate that for many participants what is conceptualized as the 
extended self is largely external to the core self and its non-physicality with the 
physicality and relative impermanence of goods informing that view, thus inscribing a 
variety of physical and symbolic levels (cf. Ahuvia, 2005).  Significantly, there are 
distinct individual differences in these construals, such that for some participants self-
characteristics are more embodied in physical representations than for others. This is not 
only a very localized-poststructuralist perspective on consumers’ construals, but it also 
suggests that naturalizing as a process is contextual; consumers may not only naturalize 
aspects of the (extended-)self differently from researchers but also from each other. 
 Consumer understanding of materialism embodies the cultural framing of the 
extended self, that is, in tacit-implicit materiality culture-like terms as opposed to the 




take issue with the extended self and especially its materialistic ties, there is abundant 
resistance.  Resistance is a theme which here is reflected not so much in market-
sanctioning consumer experimentation, but more in resistance to the market itself 
(Kozinets and Handleman, 2004).  It manifests in ways that stand at the very conception 
of self; some consumers clearly want to distinguish what they think of themselves from 
what they regard as anathema to it, including the marketplace.   
These findings suggested a need for further research that might better situate 
Study 1’s conclusions.  While it identified consumer differences, it did not reveal as 
much about alternative ways of conceiving the self-goods relationship and why 
consumers might differ in their views.   
 
Studies 2 and 3: Extended self descriptor-metaphors 
Studies 2 and 3 seek to investigate how consumers perceive possessions and the 
extended self in their own understandings; we thus follow up on Belk’s (1988) own, if 
largely unfilled suggestion to study consumers’ own meanings by which they link self 
and possessions. In this regard, it may be best to think of dynamic rhizomatic mappings 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) in which a multiplicity of perspectives on the self (and 
related name-metaphors) are found flowing through conscious experience.  However, 
while there were some important differences, as noted above, the two studies also had 
many similarities and were pooled for further analysis; nonetheless, for purposes of 






Call it extended self?  
Study 2 used the term “extended self” as a prompt in soliciting the names the 
participants might use for it while the prompt in Study 3 did not use that term.  The 
motivation for asking about the extended self first comes from Cohen (1989) who 
distinguished between me and mine, that is what and who I am, and what I possess or 
own.  This distinction became particularly clear in these studies, since in providing 
alternative extended self-descriptors, some participants used the occasion to similarly 
frame the issue, distinguish possessions from themselves, and apply a variety of 
descriptors or names. In Study 1, this reflected different views underscoring consumers’ 
idiosyncratic understandings.  Yet, there also emerged a way to reflect thematically on 
them discursively as tropes. Since according to Belk (1988), the extended self may be 
viewed as a metaphor, it is important to see what forms it takes in consumers’ thought.  
Ahuvia (2005) framed the issue in terms of core self/extended self metaphors by 
allowing the self to stand for one’s identity which involves so many things that it needs 
something to give it coherence; consumers need to synthesize varying and/or competing 
aspects of themselves.  
For those participants who resisted the idea of extended self, it could be said to be 
a metaphor in representing some understanding; it stands for something that can be 
described but is imaginary to them like a fantasy: 
I would not call products and possessions the extended self.  I would call 
them items.  More exactly just what they are for example a car is a car or 
clothes are clothes.  They are not part of me they are just things that I 




with me (Raj, 22, Study 2). 
One person refused to name the extended self anything, but instead reflecting the 
loss perspective described above declared, “I am who I am. I am a soul. I don’t have an 
“extended self” because all of these extensions can be taken away as they were received” 
(Grigory, 19, Study 2).  
Similarly, Sandra (19, Study 2) reflected the same empty metaphorical 
perspective, though giving the extended self a name, but then described her family as a 
part of her: 
I would call this extended self “My possessions and I.” Possessions are 
separate from our internal selves.  We are NOT what we own… We come 
into this world with nothing and leave with nothing… I agree that the 
“self” is an integral part in how we decide what to buy, but it should 
remain separate from ourselves in other aspects of life... Possessions are 
separate from me.  My family… brings me great happiness, and I do not 
classify them as possessions or products.  My family is part of my “self.” 
 
This example reflects the contingent aspects of goods as relatively incidental and 
not central to the self.  It also reflects the embodiment dilemma.  If things are me, then 
the self is not quite separate from them; indeed, to varying degrees, it is composed of 
them.  But if it is ‘mine’, then clearly the symbolic self is seen as different from the 
body.  Larry (21, Study 2), who referred to the goods one has as “personal possessions”, 
even used the word embodiment in saying, “My dog, coin collection, or computer is not 




existence of an extended self, there was also no separate relationship with the core self.   
 
Alternative descriptors for the extended self    
One name that emerged was that four Study 3 participants unaidedly used the term 
“extension” or variants.  But only Amy (21, Study 3) used the term as Belk (1988) 
theorized by describing possessions as part of oneself; she considered one’s image as 
represented in the products one chose: 
I call this type of consumer purchase behavior “extension of the self”.  I 
think every person buys certain things that differentiate them from other 
people; or that reflect their position in society; or… they want to be in… 
So, possessions are part of the self because they represent… our position 
in society. 
The other three participants offered paradoxical explanations that applied the 
term extension and saw products as extensions of the images they are trying to project, 
but not as part of the self.  For example, one considered image, but viewed it quite 
ironically in extended self terms: 
Products are not part of us but rather extensions of ourselves.  People 
don’t always buy things because they like them, but rather there is an 
image they are trying to project… They do this by buying certain clothes, 
houses, cars… these products are not true reflections of the self… 
Advertising, peer pressure and society norms all effect our purchasing 
judgment… the things we buy can never truly be part of us (Bob, 21, 




Thus, while some consumers and theories of the self hold that image is part of the 
self, others, such as Bob , may see the image as a delusion that is not part of the real self 
(cf. Velliquette, Murray and Creyer, 1998); image is an extension, but not a part of one’s 
true self.  As Jana (26, Study 3) indicated in a nuanced perspective: 
I am not so sure that I would call products and possessions a part of self 
but rather an extension of oneself.  Our possessions reflect to others our 
interests since we purchase products that we feel express ourselves.  We 
buy a certain suit that … will express the type of person that we are.   
However, she went on to vehemently distinguish herself from products: 
No matter how important to me my car may become or how much I love it 
my car will never be a part of me.  I do not feel comfortable with stating 
that inanimate objects are a part of who I am.  That is a little too freakish 
to me and no one in my family is from the family canine or feline.  
 Some saw goods as mirroring the ‘real’ self.  For example, Dean (21, Study 2) 
viewed possessions as a reflection of self in hierarchical layers of self, body and 
products: 
Some people also use shopping as a form of a hobby, which in turn would 
be a reflection of self… I would call ones possessions as a “reflection of 
self” or perhaps “mirror of one’s soul”, all things that we possess are 
outside our bodies and more importantly outside our minds, which are the 




Hannah (22, Study 2), raises the problematics of this reflective process by 
suggesting that people form a relationship with a good over time rather than when 
making a purchase:   
Some people get used to using living in the house… Prior to their 
purchase of the house… they might choose another… the adoption or 
simply the time they spend with the house… make them believe that they 
cannot live without the house… products and possessions that have been 
called the extended self are not really the reflections of the person who 
makes such claim.  
Another also relates to the idea of a product becoming a part of oneself when 
using it as a “reasonable person.”   
When I purchase a product it does become a part of me every time I use it.  
The reason one purchase[s] a product in the first place is to fit their unique 
style.  For those who argue that products and possessions are quite 
separate from one is clearly mistaken (Andrea, 21, Study 3).  
 
Discussion of Studies 2 and 3   
The results of these studies reveal the wide variety of descriptors our informants used to 
describe the extended self.  They incorporate a range of perspectives which problematize 







Distinguishing consumer perspectives  
To further interpret consumer perspectives, we identified a few additional emergent 
themes from all three studies.  For those supporting the extended self, products and 
possessions may reflect who you are or want to be (e.g., Ben (21, Study 1) “Whatever 
product you buy… is a representation of yourself.”), are anthropomorphized (e.g., 
Martha (29, Study 1) “…they may use their car as a friend to stay with them”; Jannine 
(21, Study 2) “We buy things we want and then sometimes worship”), and/or may have 
symbolic-sentimental value (e.g., Sonja (22, Study 1) “There are certain possessions that 
are dear to us… and part of us”).  
For those not supporting the construct, goods are temporal (echoing earlier 
results, e.g., Will (24, Study 2) “No one is born with products and no one dies with 
products.”), and/or have their utilitarian purpose (e.g., Huang (32, Study 2) “Even though 
I use it everyday, I just won’t treat them as part of me…”). However, personality was 
mentioned in ways that both supported and opposed the extended self.  For example, 
Lena (24, Study 2) declares, “The house reflects particular traits of personality, but it is 
not a part of personality, just a reflection.” Yet, Agnes (23, Study 2) suggests, “these 
things I call ‘extended self’ are things that characterize my personality.”  
Similarly, Rachel (21, Study 1) used the descriptor, “external self” to support the 
extended self though with reservations, “when people put material possessions as 
priority, that is when there is a problem and the external self is distorted.” In contrast, 
Jim (21, Study 2), who did not support the idea of the extended self, also used the term, 
“external self”, and stated regarding possessions that they “have no effect on us as 




supporters of the extended self, as the personality and external self themes illustrate, 
there is no single reductive perspective.  
Further, we considered other suggested theoretical explanations for the extended 
self, including actor network and assemblage theories as suggested by Belk (2013), as 
well as Borgerson’s (2005) perspective on materiality.  While it is impossible to 
incorporate all in granular detail, we examined them in terms of our motivation to 
explore emergent perspectives on the (non-)extended self.  
 What emerges is that perceptions of agency as a force in all these theories is 
found whether or not informants supported the extended self.  This agency largely seems 
to reside in the self, but also at times in a broader co-created materiality (Borgerson, 
2005) in that informants often recognized external influences which helped inscribe 
products in their narratives.  For example, Alise (23, Study 2) in not accepting the 
extended self and thinking of the person-possession relationship as “cultural orientation” 
declares, “I might term the relationship between a person’s choice of products or 
possessions as cultural orientation because I believe that one’s culture is what shapes 
one’s mind set to make their basic buying decisions.” On the other hand, Martina (22, 
Study 3) in her support for the extended self called it “personal buying” and suggests, 
“People seem to buy products that are the norm in society, or that their peers are buying 
at that time.”   
Moreover, agency manifests in active-passive respects.  Raquel (25), who 
chooses to call the extended self by that name (she was in Study 2 where that term was 
used), nonetheless opposes it for products and states in a more passive voice, “If I have a 




and have achieved but the self will always remain.” Natasha (19, Study 2), largely 
negates the extended self while referring to it as “possessions”, also writes in a passive 
voice, “These possessions can determine your popularity when you are in high school 
even when you are an adult.”  Taking a more active extended self perspective, Olivia (21, 
Study 1) declares, “I believe that everything I own and buy identifies who I am.” More 
actively with a non-extended self view, Jenny (20, Study 1) declares, “Since, the 
products we own are not part of oneself, it can be easy to get rid of them. Let’s take for 
example a pair of shoes, once they are old or out of style we can easily throw them 
away.” These results may be said to partly support the notion that there are alternatives 
to the idea of active subjects and passive objects (Bajde, 2013), but more significantly 
they indicate the polysemic passive-active discourse consumers apply in this context.  
Thus, for the variety of themes and theories that might explain extended self 
views, we also find that they often explain non-extended self views.  We do agree with 
Belk (2013) that self in relation to objects may have both agentic and affordances 
elements, but this by no means privileges the extended self. On the contrary, it dovetails 
with a more fluid reconceptualization. 
  
Conclusions 
With the concept of the extended self in mind, the findings suggest that if we were to 
hold a mirror in front of each of our participants, they would not perceive the same thing. 
For some, the mirror would clearly reflect the extended self in much the same way that 
Belk saw it. For others, the concept might be vaguely discernible, while for still others 




reflected in this research suggest a co-constitution of self and objects, which displaces 
unreflective and predetermined “naturalized’ hierarchies” (Bajde, 2013, 237).  Thus, 
much as researchers have disagreed over the status of the extended self since the Belk-
Cohen debate, we find that consumers additionally reveal a broad range of emic 
perceptions. At the same time, our findings are exploratory and reflect limitations in 
terms of the student samples, the written protocol method, how well we represented 
consumers’ views, and in particular, possible demand artifacts which we attempted to 
correct for; future research should indeed address them. Nonetheless, our work 
illuminates the extended self blind spot by providing a more nuanced perspective on 
traditional theory (Brownlie and Hewer, 2007) in several emerging, if overlapping 
phases.   
The first phase compared consumer emic and researcher etic theories in explicit 
terms; while some study participants echoed Belk’s extended self conceptualization, 
others buttressed the case of Cohen for reining in the construct.  Our empirical approach 
produced quotes that were often quite like those of both researchers. The second phase 
involves taking the comparisons made between emic-consumer and etic-researcher 
theories and using them to further develop extended self theory.  The objective is not just 
to discover consumers’ own theories, but also to advance a comparative perspective for 
etic theory development. The third phase was to consider some other theoretical 
explanations (e.g., materiality theory), but in doing so, we find they do not distinguish 
consumers holding different extended self views. The final phase is to recognize the 
naturalizing of all these perspectives, such that researchers may naturalize concepts like 




them differently from each other; what constitutes the extended self is liquid in definition 
and boundaries. Moreover, while self as such is a conventional, if fluid concept (e.g., 
Gould, 2010), the extended self appears transparent to some, while opaque to others. 
 Therefore, the conventional, quasi-positivistic narrative-construction of the 
extended self constitutes a major theoretical blind spot that needs to be surmounted by 
critically incorporating more nuanced, poststructural accounts.  The failure to do so 
within marketing theory means to engage in a kind of erasure (Derrida, 1997) of 
consumers’ perspectives, which leads to, at best, an incomplete de-contextualized, 
epistemological account of the extended self phenomenon, and, at worst, a complete 
misreading of the construct altogether (Gould, 2010).  Thus, the naturalized, partially 
fictitious (Cohen, 1994) extended self meta-narrative may have to yield to something less 
certain and yet more ambiguous, situated, and paradoxical. Perhaps most importantly, the 
very construct of the extended self as held by consumers and theoreticians alike needs to 
be critically re-examined in terms of its polysemy, its degrees of cohesiveness and 
plasticity, its explicitness and implicitness and the appropriate tropes for revealing it.  
Further, our findings suggest that, to a greater or lesser extent, consumers 
variously identify with either extended or unextended selves, especially when the 
participants’ metaphors for the extended self are considered. Indeed, the participants 
suggest a very contextual, constructivist view of the extended self.  Most theories about 
it tend to be universalized (i.e., all consumers relate goods to their extended selves) and it 
is virtually reified as a consumer characteristic.  Here, the idea of the extended self 
paradoxically seems to be highly individualized and reflective of more nuance even as it, 




Askegaard and Linnet, 2011). Building on what Ahuvia (2005) says about consumers 
trying to formulate coherent self-narratives, our work further suggests that such 
narratives and the very idea of selfness should be explored not only in broad cultural 
discourses, but also in relation to very individualized local knowledge creation practices.  
Thus, the assumed postmodern fragmentation of the self may be seen not only in its 
splintering as a cohesive whole, but also as a fragmentation of ideas and knowledge 
about it. 
The participants’ views also illuminate prior research and/or emergent aspects of 
what we have called the ‘extended self’ in terms of characteristics, including inner-outer, 
materialism and me-mine. However, these findings also suggest that even as a 
descriptive trope, there is much to ponder. On the whole, the unextended self exists 
simultaneously with the extended self in the form of contextually constructed parallel 
self-discourses, but not necessarily as parallel everyday beliefs about the self.  The core 
self would appear to be captured in the idea of a symbolic self differing from both the 
physical self and world; the conceptualization of the extended self may be seen as a 
paradoxical attempt to explain the person-goods relationship in that it seeks to make 
coherent what is fragmented, namely all the consumer roles and related uses of goods.  
Moreover, participants tended to either focus on some aspect of self or products 
in describing the ‘extended self’. Especially important findings were that for many how 
they describe it suggested they were inclined to see it dynamically and agenticly.  For 
some, there is a central self in the act of possessing something rather than a static self-
aspect akin to the extended self; the symbolic self is quite different from the body and 




that of the extended self. For others, the extended self functions dynamically in that over 
time it renders products as part of it, much as Belk might predict. However, for those not 
holding to the extended self, products were recognized as what they literally were (e.g., 
“items”, “possessions”), though it could still be understood conceptually, that is 
informants could recognize it even as they did not experience or believe it (cf. 
Thompson, 1990).  
Indeed, the issue of what the construct means remains unsettled.  Particularly 
vexing is the issue of what might be called metacognitive self-awareness of the extended 
self.  The participants seemed to readily recognize the idea of the extended self, whether 
or not they accepted it or had thought about it before, perhaps reflecting some tacit 
understanding. It is even possible that the idea of the extended self could become a 
naturalized cultural construct if people started to conceptualize and use the term in 
everyday discourse.  In any case, future research should reflect this self-awareness 
aspect. Can we say that consumers who act with self-conscious perceptions of the 
extended self are behaving in the same way as consumers who try to achieve some sort 
of core self coherence (cf. Ahuvia 2005)?  These are two very different directions of 
focus: expressing the core self versus extended self. If that is the case, then researchers 
following the extended self approach may be misconstruing who many consumers are (or 
think they are) and how they are narratively situated.  The cultural discourse of the 
goods-self relationship and possible self-extension thus requires further theoretical 
explication.  Moreover, we also suggest that future research should from the outset move 




More generally, our findings suggest the value of emic insights for etic theories 
(Gould, 2010). Indeed, researchers might also examine the largely unexamined 
rhizomatic co-construction of consumer-marketplace phenomena like the extended self.  
While it is beyond our scope to fully develop such an approach here, an emergent 
implication is that many aspects of consumer-marketplace phenomena should be 
similarly examined with the perspective that consumers, marketers and academic 
researchers constitute subcultures of discourses and meanings.  These may overlap to 
varying degrees, but the present approach is suggestive for treating all perspectives as 
emic, even those that are seemingly clearly etic, i.e., here consumer researcher 
perspectives on self.  It may seem paradoxical to develop theory this way in that emic 
discourse is co-constituted by both consumers and researchers to reformulate etic theory. 
But, it does serve to problematize the over-privileging of the etic aspect of the emic-etic 
binary; such an emic-informed analysis may be suggestive of ways that etic theory 
addresses or fails to address crucial issues.   
 
Notes 
1. The texts for each of the studies’ instructions and questions are shown in the online 
supplemental Appendix A. 
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